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We investigate the relationship between individual differences in cognitive reflection and
behavior on the social media platform Twitter, using a convenience sample of N= 1,901
individuals from Prolific. We find that people who score higher on the Cognitive Reflection
Test—a widely used measure of reflective thinking—were more discerning in their social
media use, as evidenced by the types and number of accounts followed, and by the reliability
of the news sources they shared. Furthermore, a network analysis indicates that the phe-
nomenon of echo chambers, in which discourse is more likely with like-minded others, is not
limited to politics: people who scored lower in cognitive reflection tended to follow a set of
accounts which are avoided by people who scored higher in cognitive reflection. Our results
help to illuminate the drivers of behavior on social media platforms and challenge intuitionist
notions that reflective thinking is unimportant for everyday judgment and decision-making.
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Social media has become a central force in modern life—it isa major channel for social interactions, political commu-nications, and commercial marketing. Social media can
have both positive and negative impacts. For example, on the
positive side, user-generated content on social media has facili-
tated social connection by helping friends and relatives who are
separated by distance stay abreast of what is happening in each
other’s lives1,2 and by helping to connect strangers who have
similar interests3. Social media has also helped to spread aware-
ness of diseases and philanthropic causes (e.g., the ALS ice bucket
challenge4), helped people in need to generate resources (e.g.,
crowdfunding for medical bills5), and quickly disseminated
information during disasters (e.g., Facebook’s “marked safe”
tool6). However, social media also allows the spread of mis-
information7 and scams8, may facilitate the emergence of echo
chambers and political polarization9,10, and could be a host for
interference and automated propaganda bots10,11.
Given the substantial importance of social media in people’s
lives, and the wide range of content available therein, it is
therefore of scientific and practical interest to understand how
people interact with social media, and what influences their
decisions to share various types of content and follow different
accounts/pages. Prior work in this vein has explored the rela-
tionship between social media use and various personality and
demographic measures, such as the “Big-Five”12–14, the “Dark
Triad”15, partisanship16,17, age16,17, and gender18.
Here we add to this literature by using a cognitive science lens
to explain components of social media engagement across a wide
range of content. This also allows us to contribute to an ongoing
debate within the cognitive science literature between two com-
peting accounts of the factors that determine people’s beliefs and
behaviors. This debate is grounded in dual-process theories,
which distinguish reflective or analytic thought from the intuitive
responses that emerge autonomously (and often quickly) when an
individual is faced with a triggering stimulus19–22. One of the key
implications of this distinction is that analytic thinking (unlike
intuitive processing) is, to some extent, discretionary—that is,
people may or may not engage in deliberation and this tendency
varies across individuals20,23.
Consider the following question: “If you’re running a race and
you pass the person in second place, what place are you in?”24
The answer that intuitively comes to mind for many people is
“first place”; however, second place is the correct answer. This
problem illustrates the importance of overriding intuitive
responses that seem correct via analytic processing25–27. Here we
investigate how this individual difference (“cognitive style”)
relates to behavior on Twitter. To do so, we measure cognitive
style using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)25—a set of
questions with intuitively compelling but incorrect answers (such
as the example above) that is widely used in behavioral economics
and psychology to measure the propensity to engage in analytic
thinking (and that does not strongly correlate with personality,
e.g., “Big Five”28).
While there appears to be general agreement surrounding the
theoretical utility of dual-process theory (but see refs. 29,30), there
is a great deal of disagreement about the relative roles of intuition
and reflection in people’s everyday lives. It has been famously
argued that humans are like an “emotional dog with a rational
tail”31—that our capacity to reflect is underused in such a way
that its primary function is merely to justify our intuitive judg-
ments32. Similarly, it has been argued that the main function of
human reasoning is argumentation—that is, convincing others
that you are correct—rather than truth-seeking per se33,34.
The “intuitionist” perspective implies that the real-world
function of reasoning is to merely justify and reinforce the
beliefs and behaviors that we have learned culturally. Relatedly, it
has been argued that the human capacity to reflect actually
reduces accuracy by driving polarization around ideological
issues35,36. This, in turn, implies that whatever variation emerges
between individuals on reasoning tasks in a laboratory context is
unlikely to be predictive in terms of everyday behaviors for the
simple reason that variation on a skill that is ineffective or
unimportant should not predict behavior.
However, there is also a growing literature that demonstrates
positive everyday consequences of analytic thinking. This
“reflectionist” perspective37 argues that thinking analytically
actually does have a meaningful impact on our beliefs and
behaviors and typically does so in a manner that increases
accuracy. Evidence for this account comes from laboratory stu-
dies where cognitive style is positively associated with a wide
range of social phenomena, such as religious disbelief38,39, para-
normal disbelief39, rejection of conspiracist claims40, increased
acceptance of science41, and rejection of pseudo-profound non-
sense42. More reflective individuals are also less likely to offload
their thinking to internet searches43. Of particular relevance to
the current paper, people who perform better on the CRT are less
likely to believe “fake news” stories44–46 and they self-report a
lower likelihood of sharing such content on social media45,46, as
well as reporting less trust in unreliable fake news or hyper-
partisan news sources47. Finally, self-reported actively open-
minded thinking style—which is related to, but distinct from
cognitive style—was associated with less tweeting but longer
tweets, a lower likelihood of having human faces in profile pic-
tures, and subtle differences in language use48. Taken together,
this body work supports the reflectionist account and suggests
that people who perform better on the CRT may differ system-
atically in their social media behavior from people who perform
worse—and in particular, that higher CRT performers may be
more discerning (i.e., less likely to follow and share epistemically
questionable or facile content).
Crucially, however, this research is almost entirely based on
self-reported beliefs and behaviors in survey studies. This is a
substantial limitation because the debate between the intuitionist
and reflectionist perspectives comes down to the outcomes or
consequences of analytic thinking in the context of daily life. The
intuitionist perspective dictates that analytic thinking is not
particularly important or effective outside of artificial laboratory
settings, whereas the reflectionist perspective dictates that analytic
thinking is crucial for dictating everyday behaviors.
Results
Here we investigate the relationship between analytic thinking
and naturally occurring behavior on social media, with the goal of
distinguishing between these broad accounts of information
processing. To do so, we use a hybrid laboratory-field set-up to
investigate such differences by linking survey data to actual
behavior on Twitter. We recruited a convenience sample of
participants (N= 1901; 55% female; Medianage= 33 years; see
Supplementary Tables 1 and 2 and Supplementary Fig. 1 for
further descriptive statistics) who completed the CRT questions
and provided their Twitter username. We then used the Twitter
API to pull public information from the users’ profiles on Twitter,
allowing us to investigate the relationship between a user’s CRT
score and three main dimensions of their “digital fingerprint”:
basic characteristics of their profile, the accounts they follow, and
the contents of their tweets.
In the main text, we report relationships between measures of
interest and z-scored CRT score (proportion of correct answers
given to CRT questions) as the main independent variable, as well as
z-scored age, gender (0=male, 1= female), ethnicity (0= non-
white, 1=white), political ideology (1= strong liberal, 5= strong
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conservative), US residency (0= non-US, 1=US), education level
(0= less than college degree, 1= college degree or higher), income
(1= lowest income group in the participant’s country, 10= highest
income group in the participant’s country), and time to complete the
survey (log-transformed time to complete the survey, in seconds).
Furthermore, because the Twitter API only allows us to collect the
3200 most recent tweets, the age of the retrieved tweets may be lower
for tweets from more active users; therefore, to avoid temporal
confounds, all analyses of tweets include month fixed effects (i.e.,
dummies for each year–month combination). See Supplementary
Tables 1–22 for all detailed models and also accounting for multiple
comparisons using either the Bonferroni–Holm correction49 or
maintaining a 5% false discovery rate using the Benjamini–Hochberg
procedure50.
Profile characteristics. We begin by examining the relationship
between CRT and basic profile features: number of accounts
followed, number of followers, total number of tweets, number of
tweets in the past 2 weeks, number of favorited tweets, number
of lists, and number of days on Twitter. As each of these quan-
tities is an overdispersed count variable (see Supplementary
Table 3), we use negative binomial regression to predict each
quantity, taking CRT as the main independent variable, as well as
users’ demographics. We find that subjects who scored higher on
the CRT follow significantly fewer other accounts (incidence rate
ratio= 0.867, p= 0.001). This is some first suggestive evidence of
higher CRT users being more discerning, in that they follow fewer
accounts (and thus expose themselves to less content). But, of
course, the specific accounts they follow (discussed below) are
much more relevant for following discernment than the total
number. The relationship between CRT and all other profile
characteristics was non-significant (p > 0.10 for all; see Supple-
mentary Tables 4–10 for full regression tables). This includes
other potential measures of being discerning, such as tweet count
and number of favorites. Thus our analysis of profile character-
istics is overall somewhat agnostic regarding the connection
between CRT and discernment.
Additionally, we find age, female gender, and white ethnicity
are significantly positively related to the number of accounts
followed by the user; age, female gender, white ethnicity, and
higher education are significantly positively related, and political
conservativism and time to complete the survey are significantly
negatively related to the user’s number of followers; female
gender and white ethnicity are significantly positively related to
the user’s number of tweets; female gender is significantly
positively related and political conservativism and time to
compete survey are significantly negatively related to the user’s
number of favorites; age, female gender, white ethnicity, and
higher education are significantly positively related to the user’s
number of listed accounts; US residency, income, and time to
complete the survey are significantly negatively related to the
user’s number of tweets in the past 2 weeks; and age, female
gender, and white ethnicity are significantly positively related and
political conservativism and time to complete the survey are
significantly negatively related to the number of days since the
user account was created on Twitter. See Table 1 for details.
Accounts followed. Following up on the observation that higher
CRT participants followed significantly fewer accounts, we next
examine which accounts are followed by participants who scored
lower versus those who scored higher on the CRT—that is, we
examine how CRT relates to which types of content users consume
on Twitter (the accounts one follows form a good proxy for the
content one is exposed to17). Specifically, we assess structural dif-
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To do so, we construct the co-follower network: each node in
the network represents a Twitter account that is followed by at
least 25 participants in our dataset (1860 nodes; results are robust to
using thresholds other than 25, see Supplementary Tables 11 and
12), and the edge between two given nodes is weighted by the
number of participants in our dataset that follow both nodes (Fig. 1).
Community detection analysis51 on the co-follower network
reveals two distinct clusters of accounts (Fig. 1). Table 2 shows
the 10 accounts in each cluster that are followed by the largest
number of our participants. The clusters differ substantially in the
cognitive style of their followers (Cohen’s d= 1.66; cluster 1:
mean follower CRT= 0.515, SD of mean follower CRT= 0.075,
fraction of nodes= 0.35; cluster 2: mean follower CRT= 0.419,
SD of mean follower CRT= 0.032, fraction of nodes= 0.65). Fur-
thermore, the average CRT of the followers of a given account is a
highly significant predictor of which community that account
belongs to (logistic regression predicting membership in cluster 2,
odds ratio (OR)= 0.545, p= 0.004), such that a one standard
deviation decrease in followers’ average CRT score is associated
with an 83.5% increase in the odds of an account being in the low
CRT cluster. This finding is robust to varying the follower
threshold in the community detection algorithm—regardless of the
threshold chosen, there are always at least two clusters with a sig-
nificant difference in average CRT of followers (see Supplementary
Tables 11 and 12).
These results are striking, insomuch as they suggest the
existence of “cognitive echo chambers” on social media, albeit in
an asymmetric fashion: we see a set of accounts (those in cluster
2) that are mostly followed by users who scored lower on the CRT
but avoided by users who scored higher on the CRT. Accounts in
cluster 1, conversely, are followed by users who both scored high
and low on the CRT (see Supplementary Figs. 2 and 3 for
distribution of followers’ CRT in the clusters within the co-
follower network). Interestingly, the cluster of accounts that are
preferentially followed by users who scored lower on the CRT is
roughly twice as large as the cluster of accounts that are followed
by users who scored both lower and higher on the CRT (1209
versus 651 accounts).
We also find that followers’ average age, fraction of female
followers, and fraction of followers with at least a college degree
are significantly positively related to membership in the low-CRT
cluster, whereas followers’ average income and time to complete
the survey are significantly negatively related to membership in
the low-CRT cluster in the co-followers network (Table 3).
However, unlike all other analyses we report in this paper, many
of the variables in this co-follower network-based model are
highly correlated with each other because of the aggregated
nature of the co-follower data (e.g., numerous combinations of
followers’ mean CRT, education, income, gender, and ethnicity
have correlations of r > 0.6). As a result, the various demographic
correlations should be interpreted with caution. Critically for our
main question of interest, we continue to find that the average
CRT of the followers of a given account is a highly significant and
strong predictor of which community that account belongs to
when using a model with only CRT and no demographic controls
(logistic regression, OR= 0.090, p < 0.001).
Contents of tweets. Finally, we shift from the accounts that users
follow (and thus the content they consume) to the content users
create and/or distribute themselves: their tweets (1619 subjects
had accessible public tweets on their timeline, generating a total
of 1,871,963 tweets).
We begin by investigating the sharing of news. To do so,
we focus on tweets or retweets containing links to one of the
60 news websites whose trustworthiness was rated by professional
Hi CRT followers Low CRT followers
Fig. 1 Co-follower network. Nodes represent Twitter accounts followed by at least 25 users in our dataset and edges are weighted based on the number of
followers in common. The intensity of color of each node shows the average CRT score of its followers (darker= higher CRT score). Nodes are positions
using directed-force layout on the weighted network (edges with weight <5 are not shown for visualization purposes). Visualization depicts two distinct
communities that differ in the CRT scores of their followers.
Table 2 Top accounts in each cluster within the co-follower
networks.







barackobama 0.543 aldiuk 0.471
stephenfry 0.567 poundland 0.446
bbcbreaking 0.542 argos_online 0.450
realdonaldtrump 0.526 bmstores 0.443
jk_rowling 0.535 morrisons 0.460
rickygervais 0.566 nextofficial 0.427
theellenshow 0.526 lovewilko 0.435
amazonuk 0.513 superdrug 0.381
nasa 0.630 ukmagicfreebies 0.399
twitter 0.493 top_cashback 0.448
For each cluster, the table shows the 10 accounts in each cluster with the largest number of
followers amonst our participants, along with the mean CRT score of each account’s followers.
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fact-checkers in previous work47; these news sites span a wide
range of information quality, from entirely fabricated “fake news”
sites to hyper-partisan sites that present misleading coverage of
events that did actually occur to reputable mainstream news
sources. For our analysis, we extracted and unshortened all URLs
in all tweets and collected any tweets containing links to one of
the 60 sites (728 users tweeted at least one link from one of these
sites, with 11,295 tweets in total).
First, we look at the relationship between CRT and whether a
user tweeted any links to these news sites at all. We perform a
logistic regression predicting whether a user from our sample
tweeted at least one link from the 60 news websites. We find users
who scored higher on the CRT are significantly more likely to
tweet links to news websites (OR= 1.135, p= 0.011). This
provides a first piece of evidence that users who scored higher
on the CRT are more likely to tweet about weightier subjects,
namely the news.
We also find age and female gender are significantly positively
related, whereas political conservativism and time to complete the
survey are significantly negatively related, to likelihood of
tweeting from news websites (Table 3).
For those users who tweeted links to at least one of the 60 sites,
we then perform a linear regression predicting the trustworthi-
ness of the tweeted news source based on the CRT score of the
user who shared the link, with robust standard errors clustered on
user and controlling for demographics and month fixed effects.
Doing so finds a positive correlation between CRT score and
trustworthiness of shared news sources (β= 0.078, p= 0.019;
Fig. 2). For example, higher CRT users were more likely to
retweet links to the BBC (OR= 1.232, p < 0.001) (which is highly
trusted by professional fact-checkers) and less likely to retweet
links to the Daily Mail (OR= 0.787, p < 0.001) (which is
untrusted by professional fact-checkers); these sites are particu-
larly common in our dataset because a plurality of our
participants were from the United Kingdom. We also find that
political conservativism, US residency, and time to complete the
survey are significantly negatively related to the quality of content
shared by users (Table 3). See Supplementary Tables 13 and 14
for statistical details.
Next, we examine the topics people tweeted about using
Structural Topic Modeling52, a general framework for topic
modeling with document-level covariate information. We ana-
lyzed all tweets and retweets written in English by users in our
dataset whose timeline was accessible and who had at least 10 (re)
tweets in English (1424 users). For each user, we merged all
tweets from the timeline as a document and used the user CRT
score as the covariate for the topic modeling. We found that two
particular topics are consistently correlated with high versus low
CRT scores of users: a topic involving politics (e.g., “people,”
“vote,” “trump,” “brexit”) was positively correlated with CRT and
a topic involving “get rich quick” schemes (e.g., “win,” “enter,”
“chance,” “giveaway,” “prize”) was negatively correlated with
CRT. Figure 3 shows the difference in topic prevalence for each
topic against the users’ CRT score for a seven-topic model (our
results are robust to the choice of the number of topics; see
Supplementary Table 15).
Finally, we examined the language used in the tweets at the
level of individual words. To do so, we employed the Linguistic
Inquiry Word Count (LIWC; a psychologically validated set of
word dictionaries53) approach to test how CRT scores related to
the probability of a user’s tweets containing words in various
LIWC categories. Specifically, if people who do well on the CRT
are more likely to engage in thinking (insight) to override
(inhibit) their intuitive (often emotional) responses, then we
might expect positive correlations between CRT and the use of
insight and inhibition words and negative correlations between
CRT and the use of positive and negative emotion words. Of
course, this presupposes that using insight- and inhibition-related
words is indicative of engaging in deliberation, while using
positive and negative emotion words is indicative of experiencing
Table 3 Users’ characteristics and clusters in co-followers’ network, quality of content, and tweeting from news websites.
(a) Membership in cluster 2 (b) Tweeted news websites? (c) Quality of news sites shared
OR (SE) OR (SE) β (SE)
CRT 0.545** (0.208) 1.135* (0.050) 0.078* (0.034)
Age 3.463*** (0.151) 1.389*** (0.051) −0.013 (0.038)
Gender (female) 16.38*** (0.294) 1.163** (0.050) 0.001 (0.031)
Ethnicity (white) 1.014 (0.239) 1.026 (0.051) −0.004 (0.04)
Political ideology (conservatism) 1.308 (0.185) 0.784*** (0.050) −0.177*** (0.046)
US residency 0.923 (0.342) 1.006 (0.049) −0.078* (0.036)
Education (college degree) 1.498* (0.193) 1.076 (0.051) 0.055 (0.039)
Income 0.230*** (0.232) 0.96 (0.051) 0.025 (0.038)
Log (time to complete the survey) 0.332*** (0.157) 0.857** (0.051) −0.07* (0.031)
(a) Logistic regression predicting which cluster the account belongs to using the average characteristics of their followers in our sample (threshold of number of followers from our sample K= 25). (b)
Logistic regression predicting if the user tweeted from news websites. (c) Linear regression predicting quality of news sources contained in each tweet based on the users’ characteristics, including
month fixed effects and clustering standard errors on user. Variables coded as follows: gender (0=male, 1= female), ethnicity (0= non-white, 1=white), political ideology (1= strong liberal, 5= strong
conservative), US residency (0= non-US, 1=US), education level (0= less than college degree, 1= college degree or higher), income (1= lowest income group in the participant’s country, 10= highest
income group in the participant’s country), and time to complete the survey (log-transformed time to complete the survey, in seconds). Variables used in (a) are aggregated over followers
characteristics. p values are reported using two-tailed z-test for (a) and (b) and using two-tailed t test for (c) (*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; see Supplementary Tables 11–14 for exact p values and










































Tweeters’ average CRT score
Fig. 2 Fact checker trust score of shared news sources versus average
CRT score of users. Each dot represents an outlet shared by users in our
sample on Twitter. The size of the dots represents the number of
observations. For clarity, we show outlets that have been shared at least 50
times by the users.
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positive and negative emotion. Although this is commonly
assumed by many scholars, it is clearly a substantial inferential
leap. Thus these particular results should be interpreted with
some caution.
For each word category, we use a separate logistic regression
predicting the presence of that word category in a given tweet
based on the tweeting user’s CRT as the main independent
variable, controlling for users’ demographics and month fixed
effects, with standard errors clustered on user (see Supplementary
Tables 16–22 for detailed models). Figure 4 shows the fraction of
all tweets belonging to each category as a function of the users’
CRT score. To give a better sense of what specific words are
driving these relationships, for each word category with a
significant CRT correlation, Table 4 shows the ten words with
the largest difference in frequency between low and high CRT
subjects (using median split).
As predicted based on the conceptualization of CRT as
measuring deliberativeness, we find that users with higher CRT
scores are more likely to use words associated with insight (OR=
1.138, p < 0.001) and inhibition (OR= 1.133, p < 0.001). Contrary
to our predictions, however, we found no significant correla-
tion between CRT and use of positive emotional words (OR=
0.966, p= 0.235) and a significant positive correlation between
CRT and use of negative emotion words (OR= 1.124,
p < 0.001). It is unclear how exactly to interpret these contra-
dictory results. The inconsistent pattern of correlation may reflect
the limitations of dictionary-based methods for assessing the use
of cognitive processes.
We also investigated the relationship between CRT and non-
cognitive word categories where the connection between word use
and interpretation is more straightforward. We explored the
relationship between CRT and the use of words related to
morality, as previous work has shown that CRT is associated with
different moral values54,55, judgments56, and behaviors57–59, but
has not examined the relationship between CRT and engagement
with morality more generally. And we looked at the relationship
1
2
Topic1. peopl, will, amp, trump, say, can, just,
vote, like, now, one, get, need, right, make, think,
time, brexit, want, know
Topic2. follow, amp, enter, competit, chanc,
giveaway, end, retweet, winner, give, simpli,
freebiefriday, prize, like, just, day, tampc, good
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Topic prevalence by CRT score
Fig. 3 Difference in topic proportion against CRT score of users. Topic 1 related to political engagement is positively correlated with CRT score and Topic
2 involving “get rich quick” schemes is negatively correlated with CRT score.
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Number of observations 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000
Negative emotion Morality Political
Insight Inhibition Positive emotion
Fig. 4 Word categories versus CRT score. For each word category and CRT score, dots represent the fraction of all tweets that have at least one word
from that category. The size of the dots shows the number of tweets. Lines represent the relationship between word categories and CRT score using
weighted least-square estimation. Red lines show 95% confidence internal based on the logistic regression model fitted on individual observations. Only
the relationships between CRT score and “Insight,” “Inhibition,” “Negative emotion,” “Morality,” and “Political” are significant when controlling for
demographics.
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between CRT and use of words related to politics (using the
dictionary of words suggested by ref. 60), as prior work has found
a link between CRT and political engagement61. We found a
significant positive correlation with words related to morality
(OR= 1.078, p < 0.001) and a significant positive correlation with
use of political words (OR= 1.167, p= 0.006). As a related
dictionary validation test, we also examine how political extremity
(e.g., distance from the scale midpoint for the partisanship
measure) relates to producing tweets with political language. We
found that political extremity is significantly and positively
related to the use of political words (OR= 1.235, p= 0.019; see
Supplementary Tables 16–22 for details). Finally, we had also
planned to investigate the link between CRT and religious words,
based on prior work linking CRT to reduced belief in God38.
However, we found that use of religious words was not
significantly associated with participants’ self-reported belief in
God (OR= 1.022, p= 0.33). This raises questions about the
validity of the religious word dictionary as an index of religious
belief and negates any expectation of a relationship between
religious words and CRT (we note that, as in the past work, CRT
was negatively related to self-reported belief in God; β=−0.11,
p < 0.001).
Additionally, we find that political conservatism is significantly
negatively related, and having a college degree is significantly
positively related, to use of insight words; that age, US residency,
and time to complete the survey are significantly positively
related, and political conservatism is significantly negatively
related, to use of inhibition words; that age, female gender, white
ethnicity, and political conservatism are significantly positively
related, and US residency, income, and time to complete the
survey are significantly negatively related, to use of positive
emotion words; that US residency is significantly positively
related, and age, white ethnicity, and political conservatism are
significantly negatively related, to use of negative emotion words;
that age is significantly positively related, and political con-
servatism is significantly negatively related, to use of moral words;
and that age, US residency, and time to complete the survey are
significantly positively related, and female gender, white ethnicity,
and political conservatism are significantly negatively related, to
use of political words (see Table 5 for relation between word
categories and CRT and other users’ characteristics).
Discussion
Together, these results paint a fairly consistent picture. People in
our sample who engaged in more cognitive reflection were more
discerning in their social media use: they followed fewer accounts,
shared higher quality content from more reliable sources, and
tweeted about weightier subjects (in particular, politics). These
results have numerous implications.
Returning to the debate between those who have claimed a
limited role for cognitive reflection in determining everyday
behaviors (intuitionists) and those who emphasize the importance
of the (perhaps distinctly) human capacity to use reflection to






OR (SE) OR (SE) OR (SE) OR (SE) OR (SE) OR (SE)
CRT 1.138*** (0.025) 1.133*** (0.028) 0.966 (0.029) 1.124*** (0.029) 1.078*** (0.017) 1.167** (0.056)
Age 0.955 (0.026) 1.100** (0.031) 1.118*** (0.028) 0.933* (0.031) 1.081*** (0.021) 1.32*** (0.062)
Gender (female) 0.973 (0.023) 0.991 (0.03) 1.200*** (0.025) 0.953 (0.026) 1.018 (0.02) 0.882* (0.059)
Ethnicity (white) 0.985 (0.018) 0.966 (0.018) 1.068** (0.02) 0.954* (0.02) 0.964 (0.021) 0.900* (0.041)
Political ideology
(conservatism)
0.880*** (0.027) 0.893*** (0.032) 1.079* (0.03) 0.862*** (0.03) 0.945** (0.018) 0.777*** (0.071)
US residency 1.032 (0.02) 1.074** (0.023) 0.924*** (0.022) 1.056* (0.024) 1.022 (0.02) 1.245*** (0.053)
Education (college degree) 1.050* (0.025) 0.991 (0.034) 0.961 (0.028) 1.013 (0.028) 1.012 (0.019) 0.994 (0.059)
Income 0.995 (0.026) 1.006 (0.039) 0.945* (0.027) 0.999 (0.029) 0.989 (0.021) 0.970 (0.057)
Log (time to complete the
survey)
1.047 (0.026) 1.06* (0.028) 0.935* (0.028) 1.033 (0.028) 1.015 (0.018) 1.153** (0.046)
Results are generated using logistic regression model predicting if each tweet has at least one word from a given category based on users’ characteristics, including month fixed effects and clustering
standard errors on user. Variables coded as follows: gender (0=male, 1= female), ethnicity (0= non-white, 1=white), political ideology (1= strong liberal, 5= strong conservative), US residency (0=
non-US, 1=US), education level (0= less than college degree, 1= college degree or higher), income (1= lowest income group in the participant’s country, 10= highest income group in the participant’s
country), and time to complete the survey (log-transformed time to complete the survey, in seconds). p values are reported using two-tailed z-test and without adjustment for multi-comparison (*p <
0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; see Supplementary Tables 16–21 for exact p values and adjustment for multi-comparisons). Statistically significant results are shown in bold.
Table 4 Distinctive usage of words by users who scored high versus low on the CRT.
Insight Inhibition Positive emotion Negative emotion Moral Political
think stop like f?ckin* just trump
know keep well* problem* should vote
feel conserv* sure* sh?t* right government
thought protect* better horr* help job
idea wait thank f?ck order* election
mean safe* great fail* leader* black
seems hold* hope sorry protect* political
means control* party* numb* class rights
found ignor* interest* weird* nation* law
understand refus* please* worr* rights media
For each category that is positively or significantly associated with CRT, shown are the words that have the highest difference in frequency between users who scored high and those who scored low on
the CRT (based on a median split of CRT scores). Asterisk (*) represents every combination of characters that immediately comes after.
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override intuitions (reflectionists), the results are plainly more
consistent with the latter perspective. We find that reflective
thinking (as measured in our survey study) is associated with a
wide range of naturally occurring social media behaviors. This
provides the strongest evidence to date for the consequences of
analytic thinking for everyday behaviors: If humans were so
dominated by their intuitions and emotions (“emotional dogs with
rational tails”), then variation in people’s tendency to reason
should not be particularly important for understanding their
everyday behaviors. Plainly, this is not the case. Furthermore, each
of these associations has important theoretical implications in
their own right that we will now enumerate; together, they paint a
consistent picture of reflective thinking as an important positive
force in judgment and decision-making outside of the laboratory.
One line of prior work that the current results bear on has to
do with media truth discernment. Past work has shown that
people who are more analytic and reflective are better at identi-
fying true versus false news headlines, regardless of whether the
headlines align with their ideology (e.g., refs. 44,45). However,
these studies have relied entirely on survey experiments, where
participant responses may be driven by experimenter demand
effects or expressive responding. Additionally, in these experi-
ments, participants judge a comparatively small set of headlines
(pre-selected by the experimenters to be balanced on partisanship
and veracity). Thus these prior results may be idiosyncratic to the
specific headlines (or approach for selecting headlines) used in
designing the survey. Furthermore, these studies have focused on
contrasting true headlines with blatantly false headlines (which
may be comparatively rare outside the laboratory16,17), rather
than articles that are misleading but not entirely false (e.g., hyper-
partisan biased reporting of events that actually occurred47). Thus
the results may not generalize to the kinds of misinformation
more typically encountered online. Finally, these studies have
mostly focused on judgments of accuracy, rather than sharing
decisions. Thus, whether these previously documented associa-
tions extended to actual sharing in the naturally occurring social
media environment is an open question—particularly given that
the social media context may be more likely to activate a political
identity (as opposed to accuracy or truth) focus62,63. Yet, despite
these numerous reasons to think that prior findings may not
generalize outside the survey context, we do indeed find that
participants who perform better on the CRT share news from
higher-quality news sources. This observation substantially
extends prior support for a positive role of reasoning in news
media truth discernment.
Our results are also relevant in similar ways for prior work
regarding the role of cognitive sophistication in political engage-
ment. Prior evidence using survey experiments suggests that people
who are more cognitively sophisticated (e.g., those who score higher
on the CRT, more educated, higher political knowledge) show
higher rates of engagement with politics. However, it has also been
suggested that this relationship may be the result of social desir-
ability bias, such that more cognitively sophisticated people simply
over-report political engagement to please the experimenter64,65.
Our results, however, suggest that more reflective people are indeed
actually more engaged with politics on social media. This supports
the inference that analytic thinking is associated with increased
political engagement.
More broadly, cognitive reflection has been associated with
lower gullibility—that is, less acceptance of a large range of
epistemically suspect beliefs (such as conspiracy theories, para-
normal claims, etc.—see ref. 20 for a review), including decreased
susceptibility to pseudo-profound nonsense42. Again, however,
these findings are rooted in survey evidence and not real-world
behavior and could reflect socially desirable responding. Here we
find that low CRT is associated with increased following of and
tweeting about money-making scams and get-rich-quick schemes.
This supports the conclusion that more intuitive people may
indeed be more gullible.
One of the most intriguing results that we uncovered was the
clustering of accounts followed by participants who scored lower
versus higher on the CRT. In particular, there was a large cluster
of accounts that were predominantly followed by participants
who scored lower on the CRT—fully two-thirds of the accounts
followed by at least 25 of our participants were in this lower-CRT
cluster. This observation is particularly interesting in the context
of the extensive discussion of partisan echo chambers, in which
supporters of the same party are much more likely to interact
with co-partisans9,10. Our network analysis indicates that the
phenomenon of echo chambers is not limited to politics: the
cognitive echo chambers we observe have potentially important
implications for how information flows through social media.
Furthermore, it is likely that cognitive echo chambers are not
confined to social media—future work should investigate this
phenomenon more broadly. Relatedly, the clustering that we
observe in the co-follower network relates to the extensive the-
oretical literature on dynamic social networks, and in particular
the emergence of clustering in agents’ cognitive style66,67. It
would be fruitful for future theoretical work to model cognition
and networks in the context of co-follower networks, rather than
the direct connections considered in past work. Future work
should also use field experiments examining link formation and
reciprocity on social media68 to test for causal effects of shared
cognitive style on following behavior.
There are, of course, important limitations of the present work.
Most notably, we were only able to consider the Twitter activity of
a tiny subset of all users on the platform. Thus it is important for
future work to examine how our results generalize to other more
representative sets of users—and in particular to users who did
not opt into a survey experiment. One potential approach that
may be fruitful in this endeavor is training a machine learning
model to estimate users’ CRT scores based on their social media
activity. Relatedly, it will be important to test how the results
generalize to other social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, Lin-
kedIn) and to users from non-Western cultures (e.g., Weibo,
WeChat). Additionally, the dictionary-based approach that we
used to analyze the language content of the tweets, although
widely used in the social sciences, is limited in terms of measuring
complex psychological constructs based on usage of single words.
Future work should also examine how the results obtained here
generalize to other measures of cognitive sophistication beyond
the CRT.
In sum, here we have shed light on social media behavior
through the lens of cognitive science. We have provided evidence
that one’s extent of analytic thinking predicts a wide range of
social media behaviors. These results meaningfully extend prior
survey studies, demonstrating that analytic thinking plays an
important role outside the laboratory. This reinforces the claim
that the human capacity to reason is hugely consequential and
something that should be cultivated and improved rather than
ignored. Research findings that highlight surprising impacts of
intuitions, emotions, gut feelings, or implicit biases should be
interpreted in light of our findings that explicit reasoning remains
central to the human condition.
Methods
Our study was approved, and informed consent was waived, by the Yale Human
Subjects Committee, IRB Protocol # 2000022539.
Participants. We used a non-representative international convenience sample and
included controls for demographic features. We recruited participants via Pro-
lific69, a subject pool for online experiments that consists of mostly UK- and
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US-based individuals. We used a feature on Prolific to selectively recruit partici-
pants who self-reported using Twitter on a regular basis. We recruited 2010 par-
ticipants from June 15, 2018 to June 20, 2018. Twitter IDs were provided by
participants at the beginning of the study. However, some participants entered
obviously fake Twitter IDs—for example, the accounts of celebrities. To screen out
such accounts, we excluded accounts with follower counts above the 95th per-
centile in our dataset. We had complete data and usable Twitter IDs for 1901 users
(55% female, Medianage= 33, 43% UK residents, 18% US residents, and the rest
mostly from Canada, Spain, Italy, and Portugal; see Supplementary Table 1 for
descriptive statistics of the subject pool).
Survey materials and procedure. In addition to various other measures outside
the scope of the current paper, participants were given the seven-item CRT45,
which consists of a reworded version of the original three-item CRT25 and a four-
item non-numeric CRT24. For each subject, we calculated the CRT score as the
proportion of correct answers to the CRT questions, resulting in a number
[0–1]. Participants also completed a demographics questionnaire that included
education, English fluency, social and economic political ideology (as separate
questions), ethnicity, belief in God, religious affiliation, class, and income. We also
recorded the time taken to complete the survey, which we follow ref. 70 in log
transforming in our analysis because it has a highly right-skewed distribution. Full
experimental materials can be found here: https://osf.io/guk3m/.
Twitter data. We then used the Twitter API to retrieve users’ public information,
including general profile information (total number of tweets, accounts followed,
followers, etc.), the content of their last 3200 tweets (capped by the Twitter API
limit), and the list of accounts followed by each user in our dataset (only 6% of
users in our sample happened to follow each other on Twitter). We retrieved data
from Twitter on August 18, 2018. As part of our revisions during the peer review
process, we also retrieved the tweets and retweets of all users on April 12, 2020 and
merged the two datasets to maximize the number of tweets in our data. We linked
the survey responses with Twitter data for our subsequent analysis.
For word-level analysis, we removed punctuation then cross-referenced all
words in each tweet with the patterns in each word dictionary. We then flagged the
tweet against all categories that had at least one pattern matched.
To create the co-follower network, we first constructed a bipartite graph
representing all users in our study and all accounts they followed on Twitter. We
then created the associated weighted mono-partite graph of the accounts that had
at least K followers from our subject pool. Each account is represented by the
aggregated demographic characteristics of its followers (e.g., fraction female,
fraction US resident, fraction white, and average age).
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
For confidentiality reasons, the Twitter data are only available upon request. A reporting
summary for this article is available as a Supplementary Information file. Full
experimental materials can be found here: https://osf.io/guk3m/.
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1. Supplementary Figures 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 1. Distribution of users' CRT score in our sample. Shown here is the distribution of proportion of 
correct answers given to the CRT questionnaire by individual subjects in our study. 
 
Supplementary Figure 2. Distribution of average CRT score of followers in the co-follower network. Shown here is the 
distribution of average CRT score of followers for each account in the co-follower network. This includes accounts followed 
by at least 25 users in our dataset (K=25). 
 
Supplementary Figure 3. Distribution of average CRT of followers in clusters of the co-follower network. Shown here are 
distributions of average CRT score of followers for two clusters within the co-follower network including accounts followed 
by at least 25 users in our dataset. There are one cluster of accounts that is mostly followed by users who scored lower in the 
CRT (narrower distribution) and one cluster of accounts that is mostly followed by users who scored mixed (both high and 
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2. Supplementary Tables 
 
Supplementary Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all variables. Reported here are descriptive statistics of subjects’ scores 
on the Cognitive Reflection Test, demographic information, and time to complete the survey. 
 Mean Median STD Min Max 
CRT .532 .571 .287 0 1 
Age 34.128 33 11.224 18 66 
Gender 
(female) .554 1 .486 0 1 
Ethnicity 
(white) .834 1 .371 0 1 
Political ideology 
(conservatism) 2.448 2.5 .918 1 5 
US residency .182 0 .386 0 1 
Education 
(college degree) .611 1 .488 0 1 
Income 
4.539 5 1.809 1 10 
Log (time to complete 
survey) 
6.673 6.645 .463 4.934 1.885 
 
Supplementary Table 2. Correlation of (z-scored) covariates with CRT. Reported here are coefficients and p-values from 
Pearson correlation two-sided test (results are not adjusted for multi-comparisons). 
 r p 
Age -.076 9.0e-04 
Gender 
(female) -.106 3.4e-06 
Ethnicity 
(white) .058 1.1e-02 
Political ideology 
(conservatism) -.073 1.5e-03 
US residency <.001 .989 
Education 
(college degree) .105 4.8e-06 
Income 
.050 2.9e-02 














Supplementary Table 3. Test for overdispersion of count data. P-values are reported from Pearson's Chi-Squared test. 




rate p value 
Followed count 
398.981 586,503.400 1,470.003 1,420.911 
0.0e+00 
Followers count 
208.842 245,013.300 1,173.201 1,173.946 
0.0e+00 
Tweets count 
4,014.138 294,920,100.000 73,470.359 62,713.881 
0.0e+00 
Favorites count 
1,987.505 46,479,060.000 23,385.634 23,472.891 
0.0e+00 
Listed count 
8.285 1,208.063 145.821 144.331 
0.0e+00 
Tweets in past two 
weeks 22.912 9,206.998 401.837 375.472 
0.0e+00 
Number of days on 







Supplementary Table 4. Followed count. Results are generated using negative binominal regression taking users’ z-scored 
CRT score as independent variable. Model 1) no controls; Model 2) controlling for age, gender, and ethnicity; Model 3) 
controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, US residency, education, social/economic conservatism, Income, and Log (time to 
complete the survey). p-values are reported based on two-tailed z-test and are also adjusted for multi-comparisons: pBH is 
corrected p-value using Bonferroni-Holms and pHolm using Benjamini Hochberg procedure. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 IRR (SE) p pBH pHolm 
IRR 
(SE) p pBH pHolm 
IRR 
(SE) p pBH pHolm 
CRT .844 (.035) 4.6e-05 3.2e-04 3.2e-04 
.867 
(.035) 4.3e-04 3.0e-03 3.0e-03 
.867 
(.036) 5.6e-04 3.9e-03 3.9e-03 
Age     1.168 (.044) 3.5e-05 8.2e-05 1.8e-04 
1.189 
(.045) 5.7e-06 1.3e-05 2.8e-05 
Gender 
(female)     
1.164 
(.049) 3.3e-04 5.8e-04 1.4e-03 
1.144 
(.049) 1.7e-03 4.0e-03 8.5e-03 
Ethnicity 
(white)     
1.156 
(.053) 1.4e-03 3.1e-03 7.0e-03 
1.129 




        .954 (.046) .332 .387 .876 




        1.011 (.043) .796 .796 1 
Income         .958 (.042) .326 .456 .978 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 






Supplementary Table 5. Followers count. Results are generated using negative binominal regression taking users’ z-scored 
CRT score as independent variable. Model 1) no controls; Model 2) controlling for age, gender, and ethnicity; Model 3) 
controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, US residency, education, social/economic conservatism, Income, and Log (time to 
complete the survey). p-values are reported based on two-tailed z-test and are also adjusted for multi-comparisons: pBH is 
corrected p-value using Bonferroni-Holms and pHolm using Benjamini Hochberg procedure. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 IRR (SE) p pBH pHolm 
IRR 
(SE) p pBH pHolm 
IRR 
(SE) p pBH pHolm 
CRT .956 (.049) .375 .454 1 
.985 
(.048) .752 .752 1 
.965 
(.045) .447 .447 .96 
Age     1.111 (.059) 4.7e-02 .066 .141 
1.143 
(.065) 1.8e-02 3.2e-02 .072 
Gender 
(female)     
1.155 
(.065) 1.0e-02 1.2e-02 2.0e-02 
1.129 
(.059) 2.1e-02 2.4e-02 4.2e-02 
Ethnicity 
(white)     
1.182 
(.063) 1.8e-03 3.1e-03 7.2e-03 
1.176 




        .84 (.054) 6.7e-03 1.6e-02 3.4e-02 




        1.124 (.057) 2.2e-02 .084 .154 
Income         1.018 (.049) .719 .839 1 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 






Supplementary Table 6. Tweets count. Results are generated using negative binominal regression taking users’ z-scored CRT 
score as independent variable. Model 1) no controls; Model 2) controlling for age, gender, and ethnicity; Model 3) controlling 
for age, gender, ethnicity, US residency, education, social/economic conservatism, Income, and Log (time to complete the 
survey). p-values are reported based on two-tailed z-test and are also adjusted for multi-comparisons: pBH is corrected p-value 
using Bonferroni-Holms and pHolm using Benjamini Hochberg procedure. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 IRR (SE) p pBH pHolm 
IRR 
(SE) p pBH pHolm 
IRR 
(SE) p pBH pHolm 
CRT .799 (.082) 2.8e-02 .072 .174 
.878 
(.079) .147 .262 .735 
.894 
(.09) .266 .341 .96 
Age     1.004 (.067) .957 .957 .957 
1.05 
(.081) .522 .522 .522 
Gender 
(female)     
1.472 
(.097) 4.4e-09 3.1e-08 3.1e-08 
1.423 
(.100) 4.7e-07 2.9e-06 3.3e-06 
Ethnicity 
(white)     
1.251 
(.077) 2.8e-04 9.7e-04 1.7e-03 
1.215 




        .849 (.087) .108 .189 .432 




        .976 (.078) .758 .796 1 
Income         .887 (.067) .111 .228 .600 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 






Supplementary Table 7. Favorites. Results are generated using negative binominal regression taking users’ z-scored CRT 
score as independent variable. Model 1) no controls; Model 2) controlling for age, gender, and ethnicity; Model 3) controlling 
for age, gender, ethnicity, US residency, education, social/economic conservatism, Income, and Log (time to complete the 
survey). p-values are reported based on two-tailed z-test and are also adjusted for multi-comparisons: pBH is corrected p-value 
using Bonferroni-Holms and pHolm using Benjamini Hochberg procedure. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 IRR (SE) p pBH pHolm 
IRR. 
(SE) p pBH pHolm 
IRR 
(SE) p pBH pHolm 
CRT 1.067 (.084) .411 .454 1 
1.096 
(.084) .236 .33 .735 
1.099 
(.082) .204 .341 .96 
Age     .792 (.085) 3.1e-02 .054 .124 
.84 
(.087) .092 .129 .276 
Gender 
(female)     
1.357 
(.114) 2.7e-04 5.8e-04 1.4e-03 
1.269 
(.1) 2.6e-03 4.5e-03 1.0e-02 
Ethnicity 
(white)     
1.007 
(.086) .939 .939 .939 
1.022 




        .714 (.059) 4.7e-05 3.3e-04 3.3e-04 




        .878 (.065) .078 .182 .390 
Income         .87 (.074) .100 .228 .600 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 







Supplementary Table 8. Listed count. Results are generated using negative binominal regression taking users’ z-scored 
CRT score as independent variable. Model 1) no controls; Model 2) controlling for age, gender, and ethnicity; Model 3) 
controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, US residency, education, social/economic conservatism, Income, and Log (time to 
complete the survey). p-values are reported based on two-tailed z-test and are also adjusted for multi-comparisons: pBH is 
corrected p-value using Bonferroni-Holms and pHolm using Benjamini Hochberg procedure. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 IRR (SE) p pBH pHolm 
IRR 
(SE) p pBH pHolm 
IRR 
(SE) p pBH pHolm 
CRT .902 (.1) .352 .454 1 
.954 
(.091) .617 .72 1 
.891 
(.098) .292 .341 .96 
Age     1.539 (.123) 6.3e-08 2.2e-07 3.8e-07 
1.569 
(.131) 7.4e-08 2.6e-07 4.5e-07 
Gender 
(female)     
1.433 
(.137) 1.7e-04 5.8e-04 1.0e-03 
1.464 
(.113) 8.4e-07 2.9e-06 5.1e-06 
Ethnicity 
(white)     
1.5 
(.131) 3.2e-06 2.2e-05 2.2e-05 
1.546 




        .879 (.108) .292 .387 .876 




        1.198 (.096) 2.4e-02 .084 .154 
Income         1.015 (.089) .864 .864 1 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 






Supplementary Table 9. Tweets in past two weeks. Results are generated using negative binominal regression taking users’ 
z-scored CRT score as independent variable. Model 1) no controls; Model 2) controlling for age, gender, and ethnicity; Model 
3) controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, US residency, education, social/economic conservatism, Income, and Log (time to 
complete the survey). p-values are reported based on two-tailed z-test and are also adjusted for multi-comparisons: pBH is 
corrected p-value using Bonferroni-Holms and pHolm using Benjamini Hochberg procedure. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 IRR (SE) p pBH pHolm 
IRR 
(SE) p pBH pHolm 
IRR 
(SE) p pBH pHolm 
CRT .811 (.079) 3.1e-02 .072 .174 
.845 
(.08) .075 .262 .45 
.865 
(.096) .192 .341 .96 
Age     1.125 (.121) .274 .32 .548 
1.175 
(.129) .143 .167 .286 
Gender 
(female)     
1.238 
(.12) 2.8e-02 2.8e-02 2.8e-02 
1.155 
(.109) .125 .125 .125 
Ethnicity 
(white)     
1.186 
(.106) .056 .065 .112 
1.144 




        .962 (.121) .758 .758 .876 




        .956 (.094) .644 .796 1 
Income         .746 (.067) 1.1e-03 7.6e-03 7.6e-03 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 






Supplementary Table 10.  Days on Twitter. Results are generated using negative binominal regression taking users’ z-scored 
CRT score as independent variable. Model 1) no controls; Model 2) controlling for age, gender, and ethnicity; Model 3) 
controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, US residency, education, social/economic conservatism, Income, and Log (time to 
complete the survey). p-values are reported based on two-tailed z-test and are also adjusted for multi-comparisons: pBH is 
corrected p-value using Bonferroni-Holms and pHolm using Benjamini Hochberg procedure. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 IRR (SE) p pBH pHolm 
IRR 
(SE) p pBH pHolm 
IRR 
(SE) p pBH pHolm 
CRT 1.012 (.011) .274 .458 1 
1.02 
(.011) .072 .252 .432 
1.016 
(.011) .135 .341 .81 
Age     1.084 (.011) 2.0e-16 1.4e-15 1.4e-15 
1.096 
(.011) 1.1e-19 7.8e-19 7.8e-19 
Gender 
(female)     
1.038 
(.011) 7.3e-04 1.0e-03 2.2e-03 
1.033 
(.011) 3.3e-03 4.6e-03 1.0e-02 
Ethnicity 
(white)     
1.037 
(.013) 4.5e-03 6.3e-03 1.3e-02 
1.031 




        .967 (.01) 1.6e-03 5.7e-03 9.7e-03 




        1.01 (.011) .358 .626 1 
Income         .983 (.011) .13 .228 .6 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 







Supplementary Table 11. Logistic regression predicting if the account belongs to low CRT cluster using the average 
characteristics of their followers in our sample (threshold of number of followers from our sample K=25). Model 1) no 
controls; Model 2) controlling for age (average age of followers), gender (male fraction of followers), and ethnicity (white 
fraction of followers); Model 3) age (average age of followers), gender (male fraction of followers), and ethnicity (white 
fraction of followers), US residency (US resident fraction of followers), education (college degree fraction of followers), 
social/economic conservatism (average conservatism of followers), Income (average Income of followers), and average log 
(time to complete the survey) of followers. p-values are reported based on two-tailed z-test and without multi-comparisons 
adjustment. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 OR  (SE) p 
OR 
 (SE) p 
OR 
 (SE) p 




























    1.308 (.185) .146 




    1.498 (.193) 3.6e-02 
Income     .230 (.232) 2.0e-10 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 






Supplementary Table 12. Characteristics of clusters within co-followers’ network for various threshold of number of 
followers K. We included accounts in the network who had at least K followers from our sample. Model 1) no controls; Model 
2) controlling for age (average age of followers), gender (male fraction of followers), and ethnicity (white fraction of 
followers); Model 3) age (average age of followers), gender (male fraction of followers), and ethnicity (white fraction of 
followers), US residency (US resident fraction of followers), education (college degree fraction of followers), social/economic 
conservatism (average conservatism of followers), Income (average Income of followers), and average log (time to complete 
the survey) of followers. Across all values of the threshold for the number of followers, there exists one cluster with high 
average follower CRT score and one with low average follower CRT score. The average CRT of followers can significantly 
predict which of the two clusters the accounts belongs to. p-values are reported based on two-tailed z-test and without multi-
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Supplementary Table 13. Predicting if the user tweeted from a news website using logistic regression. Model 1) no controls; 
Model 2) controlling for age, gender, and ethnicity; Model 3) controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, US residency, education, 
social/economic conservatism, Income, and Log (time to complete the survey). p-values are reported based on z-test and 
without multi-comparisons adjustment. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 OR  (SE) p 
OR 
 (SE) p 
OR 
 (SE) p 


























(conservatism)     
.784 
(.05) 1.4e-06 
US residency     1.006 (.049) .902 
Education 
(college degree)     
1.076 
(.051) .149 
Income     .96 (.051) .422 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 








Supplementary Table 14. Predicting quality score of the tweeted outlet using linear regression with standard errors 
clustered on user. Model 1) no control; Model 2) controlling for age, gender, and ethnicity; Model 3) controlling for age, 
gender, ethnicity, US residency, education, social/economic conservatism, Income, and Log (time to complete the survey). p-
values are reported based on t-test and without multi-comparisons adjustment. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 + months dummies 
 b  (SE) p 
b 
 (SE) p 
b 
 (SE) p 
b 
 (SE) p 






































    -.181 (.049) 1.9e-04 
-.177 
(.046) 1.2e-04 






    .057 (.042) .175 
.055 
(.039) .163 
Income     .017 (.039) .657 
.025 
(.038) .522 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 










Supplementary Table 15. Topic positively and negatively related to CRT vs. various number of topics in the model. In all 
cases, there is always one topic (related to political engagement) that is positively correlated with CRT and one topic (related 
to “get rich quick” schemes) that is negatively related to CRT (.p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; p-values are reported 













peopl, will, amp, can, just, like, say, trump, one, get, now, need, vote, time, make, think, year, know, right, want  .10*** 
follow, amp, enter, giveaway, chanc, competit, end, retweet, winner, give, prize, simpli, just, freebiefriday, day, 
like, tampc, away, time  -.076** 
just, get, like, one, love, can, time, day, now, dont, good, look, think, know, will, see, make, want, got, need  .071* 
via, just, thank, free, earn, new, get, check, today, amp, love, great, book, can, day, blog, use, now, make, sponsor -.077 *** 
game, youtub, new, video, play, amp, watch, just, end, call, like, live, now, artist, onlin, one, top, playlist, wwe, run -.021 (not sig.) 
6 
peopl, will, amp, trump, just, say, can, like, vote, get, one, now, need, make, think, right, time, know, want, year  .080** 
follow, amp, enter, competit, chanc, giveaway, end, retweet, winner, give, simpli, freebiefriday, prize, like, just, 
day, tampc, away, good  -.075** 
just, like, get, one, love, dont, time, can, now, know, day, think, good, want, peopl, look, make, got, will, see .070* 
thank, day, amp, love, get, can, look, new, just, today, one, now, will, time, book, good, great, work, via, see .010 (not sig.) 
youtub, game, new, video, thank, amp, music, like, follow, now, today, get, via, art, can, will, play, end, live, check -.042* 
win, giveaway, enter, just, earn, free, chanc, via, gift, amp, card, check,get, sponsor, cash, prize, want, love, can, amazon -.050* 
7 
peopl, will, amp, trump, say, can, just, vote, like, now, one, get, need, right, make, think, time, brexit, want, know  .076** 
follow, amp, enter, competit, chanc, giveaway, end, retweet, winner, give, simpli, freebiefriday, prize, like, just, 
day, tampc, good, away  -.064** 
get, just, will, now, day, today, one, good, time, look, can, amp, see, well, thank, love, year, back, last, week .009 (not sig.) 
thank, via, book, amp, new, read, love, can, day, look, work, one, great, use, help, write, make, get, today, blog <.001 (not sig.) 
just, like, get, one, love, dont, can, know, time, think, day, peopl, want, now, make, good, realli, thing, look, got .066* 
youtub, game, new, video, like, music, follow, now, thank, get, play, amp, today, check, will, end, live, art, can, free -.037. 
win, giveaway, enter, just, earn, free, chanc, via, amp, gift, card, check, sponsor, get, prize, cash, want, love, can, 
amazon -.046* 
8 
peopl, like, just, trump, will, one, say, can, get, know, make, dont, think, realdonaldtrump, want, time, need, 
thing, right, amp  .054** 
follow, amp, competit, enter, chanc, giveaway, end, retweet, winner, give, simpli, freebiefriday, prize, tampc, like, 
day, just, good, time  -.066** 
amp, will, peopl, brexit, can, vote, now, pleas, get, one, say, just, year, need, time, think, like, support, nhs, make .056** 
just, get, like, love, one, day, can, now, time, think, dont, look, good, know, got, need, work, want, will, today .028 (not sig.) 
game, like, just, get, play, one, new, time, will, good, now, can, fuck, amp, watch, see, look, year, dont, end .011 (not sig.) 
Thank, youtub, new, via, video, today, use, music, get, work, can, amp, great, follow, look, art, now, will, make, free -.038* 
win, giveaway, enter, chanc, amp, free, just, gift, card, sponsor, check, follow, via, want, prize, get, can, game, now, 
new -.020 (not sig.) 
just, via, book, earn, read, new, love, blog, review, write, thank, amp, watch, check, today, great, mile, day, get, post -.017 (not sig.) 
9 
peopl, will, amp, trump, say, vote, just, can, now, like, one, get, need, brexit, think, realdonaldtrump, right, make, 
time, year  .064** 
follow, amp, competit, enter, chanc, giveaway, end, retweet, winner, give, simpli, freebiefriday, prize, tampc, day, 
like, just, time, good  -.070** 
thank, new, amp, can, work, use, today, great, get, will, make, music, time, one, look, now, art, write, help, read .018 (not sig.) 
amp, game, will, get, team, win, play, one, today, good, see, look, great, just, time, fan, now, year, last, new <.001 (not sig.) 
just, get, love, day, one, like, now, can, time, think, look, dont, good, will,got, know, need, today, work, thank .011 (not sig.) 
like, just, get, one, dont, time, can, know, peopl, love, make, want, fuck, now, think, thing, good, day, realli, look  .067* 
via, amp, love, new, day, thank, sponsor, free, get, dog, can, look, great, make, help, tri, beauti, today, want, food -.041* 
just, earn, via, book, check, watch, cash, read, review, free, mile, get, today, blog, onlin, call, topcashback, reward, prize, 
awesom -.032* 
in, giveaway, enter, chanc, follow, youtub, amp, free, game, card, gift, just, video, end, retweet, like, new, now, can, 
contest  -.018 (not sig.) 
10 
peopl, will, amp, trump, say, vote, just, can, now, like, one, get, need, brexit, think, right, realdonaldtrump, make, 
time, year  .064** 
follow, amp, competit, enter, chanc, giveaway, end, retweet, winner, give, simpli, freebiefriday, prize, tampc, like, 
day, just, time, good  -.069** 
thank, new, use, can, work, today, amp, get, music, great, will, make, look, now, help, via, need, time, news, follow .001 (not sig.) 
game, will, amp, get, win, team, play, good, today, fan, one, see, just, time, great, season, look, last, day, year .001 (not sig.) 
book, read, via, new, amp, write, one, love, thank, just, day, review, blog, call, like, time, post, can, year, thing .012 (not sig.) 
just, get, love, day, like, now, one, can, time, think, look, dont, good, will, got, today, need, work, know, thank .064* 
via, amp, love, new, sponsor, day, thank, dog, free, get, help, can, make, great, look, tri, want, food, today, pleas -.037* 
win, giveaway, enter, chanc, follow, amp, free, youtub, game, gift, card, just, retweet, end, new, like, prize, contest, 
winner, want -.015 (not sig.) 
just, earn, check, via, cash, watch, free, get, mile, today, reward, topcashback, awesom, download, won, walk, prize, 
game, ipad, site -.032* 





Supplementary Table 16. Use of insight words and CRT.  Predicting use of LIWC word categories taking users’ z-scored 
CRT score as independent variable using logistic regression at tweet-level with standard error cluster on username. Model 
1) no controls; Model 2) controlling for age, gender, and ethnicity; Model 3) controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, US 
residency, education, social/economic conservatism, income, and Log (time to complete the survey). p-values are reported 
based on two-tailed z-test and are also adjusted for multi-comparisons: pBH is corrected p-value using Bonferroni-Holms 
and pHolm using Benjamini Hochberg procedure.  
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 + months dummies 
 OR  (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
(intercept) .134 (.026) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
.134 
(.026) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
.133 
(.025) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
.091 
(.051) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
CRT 1.159 (.025) 6.0e-09 4.2e-08 4.2e-08 
1.157 
(.026) 2.5e-08 1.7e-07 1.7e-07 
1.137 
(.025) 3.0e-07 2.1e-06 2.1e-06 
1.138 
(.025) 2.0e-07 1.4e-06 1.4e-06 
Age     .964 (.029) .21 .245 .42 
.979 
(.028) .458 .458 .76 
.955 
(.026) .076 .089 .152 
Gender 
(female)     
.984 
(.025) .508 .593 1 
.976 
(.024) .328 .459 1 
.973 
(.023) .24 .42 .96 
Ethnicity 
(white)     
.979 
(.018) .249 .249 .249 
.985 
(.02) .437 .437 .437 
.985 





        .874 (.027) 5.6e-07 2.0e-06 3.4e-06 
.880 
(.027) 1.7e-06 6.0e-06 1.0e-05 
US residency         1.029 (.021) .17 .238 .51 
1.032 




        1.046 (.026) .079 .354 .553 
1.05 
(.025) .047 .329 .329 
Income         .992 (.027) .759 .971 1 
.995 
(.026) .835 .977 1 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 
        1.038 (.026) .141 .197 .423 
1.047 
(.026) .074 .13 .296 
Months 






Supplementary Table 17. Use of inhibition words and CRT. Predicting use of LIWC word categories taking users’ z-scored 
CRT score as independent variable using logistic regression at tweet-level with standard error cluster on username. Model 1) 
no controls; Model 2) controlling for age, gender, and ethnicity; Model 3) controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, US residency, 
education, social/economic conservatism, income, and Log (time to complete the survey). p-values are reported based on two-
tailed z-test and are also adjusted for multi-comparisons: pBH is corrected p-value using Bonferroni-Holms and pHolm using 
Benjamini Hochberg procedure.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 + month dummies 
 OR  (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
(intercept) .072 (.031) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
.072 
(.029) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
.071  
(.029) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
0 
(1.004) 3.0e-25 3.0e-25 3.0e-25 
CRT 1.138 (.029) 7.9e-06 2.5e-05 4.8e-05 
1.14 
(.031) 1.9e-05 6.5e-05 1.1e-04 
1.127 
(.029) 3.3e-05 1.2e-04 2.0e-04 
1.133 
(.028) 7.1e-06 1.9e-05 4.3e-05 
Age     1.124 (.035) 9.5e-04 1.7e-03 3.8e-03 
1.141 
(.034) 1.1e-04 1.9e-04 4.3e-04 
1.1 
(.031) 2.1e-03 3.7e-03 8.5e-03 
Gender 
(female)     
.997 
(.031) .918 .918 1 
.997 
(.033) .919 .919 1 
.991 
(.03) .759 .781 1 
Ethnicity 
(white)     
.958  
(.02) 2.9e-02 4.0e-02 .087 
.972 
(.02) .169 .197 .338 
.966 




        .883 (.033) 1.6e-04 3.3e-04 7.8e-04 
.893 
(.032) 4.1e-04 7.2e-04 1.8e-03 
US residency         1.077 (.024) 2.4e-03 5.5e-03 1.2e-02 
1.074 
(.023) 2.2e-03 5.1e-03 1.1e-02 
Education 
(college degree)         
.978 
(.038) .557 .886 1 
.991 
(.034) .796 .923 1 
Income         1.002 (.041) .971 .971 1 
1.006 
(.039) .873 .977 1 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 
        1.052 (.029) .082 .144 .328 
1.06 
(.028) 3.8e-02 .089 .19 






Supplementary Table 18. Use of positive emotion words and CRT. Predicting use of LIWC word categories taking users’ z-
scored CRT score as independent variable using logistic regression at tweet-level with standard error cluster on username. 
Model 1) no controls; Model 2) controlling for age, gender, and ethnicity; Model 3) controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, US 
residency, education, social/economic conservatism, income, and Log (time to complete the survey). p-values are reported 
based on two-tailed z-test and are also adjusted for multi-comparisons: pBH is corrected p-value using Bonferroni-Holms and 
pHolm using Benjamini Hochberg procedure.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 + month dummies 
 OR  (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
(intercept) 1.133 (.032) 7.7e-05 7.7e-05 7.7e-05 
1.134 
(.029) 1.9e-05 1.9e-05 1.9e-05 
1.135 
(.029) 9.1e-06 9.1e-06 9.1e-06 
.063 
(.06) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
CRT .915 (.033) 7.0e-03 8.2e-03 1.4e-02 
.941 
(.032) .054 .063 .108 
.962  
(.031) .217 .253 .434 
.966 
(.029) .235 .235 .46 
Age     1.141 (.029) 6.4e-06 4.5e-05 4.5e-05 
1.139 
(.028) 3.7e-06 8.6e-06 2.1e-05 
1.118 
(.028) 8.8e-05 3.1e-04 5.3e-04 
Gender 
(female)     
1.213 
(.025) 1.7e-14 1.2e-13 1.2e-13 
1.203 
(.025) 2.8e-13 1.9e-12 1.9e-12 
1.200 
(.025) 2.5e-13 1.7e-12 1.7e-12 
Ethnicity 
(white)     
1.093 
(.019) 2.5e-06 1.7e-05 1.7e-05 
1.073 
(.019) 2.8e-04 1.0e-03 2.0e-03 
1.068 




        1.074 (.031) 1.9e-02 2.2e-02 3.8e-02 
1.079 
(.03) 1.1e-02 1.3e-02 2.1e-02 
US residency         .93 (.022) 1.2e-03 4.4e-03 7.5e-03 
.924 
(.022) 3.1e-04 1.1e-03 1.8e-03 
Education 
(college degree)         
.954  
(.029) .101 .354 .606 
.961 
(.028) .152 .532 .912 
Income         .938 (.028) 2.4e-02 .168 .168 
.945 
(.027) 4.0e-02 .14 .24 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 
        .931 (.03) 1.9e-02 .066 .114 
.935 
(.028) 1.7e-02 .06 .102 







Supplementary Table 19. Use of negative emotion words and CRT. Predicting use of LIWC word categories taking users’ z-
scored CRT score as independent variable using logistic regression at tweet-level with standard error cluster on username. 
Model 1) no controls; Model 2) controlling for age, gender, and ethnicity; Model 3) controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, US 
residency, education, social/economic conservatism, income, and Log (time to complete the survey). p-values are reported 
based on two-tailed z-test and are also adjusted for multi-comparisons: pBH is corrected p-value using Bonferroni-Holms and 
pHolm using Benjamini Hochberg procedure.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 + month dummies 
 OR  (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
(intercept) .162 (.029) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 .161 (.03) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
.16 







CRT 1.142 (.03) 1.1e-05 2.5e-05 5.5e-05 
1.137 
(.031) 2.8e-05 6.5e-05 1.4e-04 
1.118 
(.029) 1.3e-04 2.3e-04 5.3e-04 
1.124 
(.029) 5.2e-05 9.1e-05 2.1e-04 
Age     .935 (.035) .052 .073 .156 
.956 
(.034) .181 .253 .543 
.933 
(.031) 2.8e-02 3.9e-02 .084 
Gender 
(female)     
.962 
(.028) .16 .373 .8 
.956 
(.027) .099 .231 .495 
.953 
(.026) .064 .149 .32 
Ethnicity 
(white)     
.948 
(.02) 8.5e-03 1.5e-02 3.4e-02 
.955 
(.021) 3.2e-02 .056 .128 
.954 




        .856 (.03) 2.8e-07 2.0e-06 2.0e-06 
.862 
(.03) 6.3e-07 4.4e-06 
4.4e-06 
 
US residency         1.054 (.025) 3.8e-02 .066 .152 
1.056 




        1.009 (.029) .759 .886 1 
1.013 
(.028) .64 .923 1 
Income         .994 (.03) .852 .971 1 
.999 
(.029) .977 .977 1 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 
        1.027 (.028) .34 .397 .68 
1.033 
(.028) .259 .302 .518 
Months 







Supplementary Table 20. Use of moral words and CRT. Predicting use of LIWC word categories taking users’ z-scored CRT 
score as independent variable using logistic regression at tweet-level with standard error cluster on username. Model 1) no 
controls; Model 2) controlling for age, gender, and ethnicity; Model 3) controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, US residency, 
education, social/economic conservatism, income, and Log (time to complete the survey). p-values are reported based on two-
tailed z-test and are also adjusted for multi-comparisons: pBH is corrected p-value using Bonferroni-Holms and pHolm using 
Benjamini Hochberg procedure.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 + month dummies 
 OR  (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
(intercept) .268 (.02) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
.267 
(.019) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
.266 
(.018) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
.189 
(.036) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
CRT 1.072 (.018) 1.1e-04 1.9e-04 4.3e-04 
1.079 
(.018) 4.4e-05 7.7e-05 1.8e-04 
1.074 
(.018) 8.9e-05 2.1e-04 4.5e-04 
1.078 
(.017) 8.0e-06 1.9e-05 4.3e-05 
Age     1.097 (.022) 2.9e-05 6.8e-05 1.5e-04 
1.108 
(.022) 3.4e-06 8.6e-06 2.1e-05 
1.081 
(.021) 1.7e-04 3.9e-04 8.4e-04 
Gender 
(female)     
1.025 
(.021) .227 .397 .908 
1.022 
(.021) .317 .459 1 
1.018 
(.02) .366 .512 1 
Ethnicity 
(white)     
.964 
(.019) .059 .069 .118 
.967 
(.021) .101 .141 .303 
.964 




        .938 (.02) 1.1e-03 1.6e-03 3.4e-03 
.945 
(.018) 2.0e-03 2.8e-03 5.9e-03 
US residency         1.024 (.021) .254 .296 .51 
1.022 




        1.003 (.02) .895 .895 1 
1.012 
(.019) .533 .923 1 
Income         .981 (.023) .408 .871 1 
.989 
(.021) .594 .977 1 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 
        1.008 (.019) .666 .666 .68 
1.015 
(.018) .412 .412 .518 
Months 







Supplementary Table 21. Use of political words and CRT. Predicting use of LIWC word categories taking users’ z-scored 
CRT score as independent variable using logistic regression at tweet-level with standard error cluster on username. Model 1) 
no controls; Model 2) controlling for age, gender, and ethnicity; Model 3) controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, US residency, 
education, social/economic conservatism, income, and Log (time to complete the survey). p-values are reported based on two-
tailed z-test and are also adjusted for multi-comparisons: pBH is corrected p-value using Bonferroni-Holms and pHolm using 
Benjamini Hochberg procedure.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 + month dummies 
 OR  (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
OR 
 (SE) p pBH pHolm 
(intercept) .092 (.06) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
.088 
(.054) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
.083 
(.054) 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 0.0e+00 
.118 
(.112) 6.3e-81 7.4e-81 1.3e-80 
CRT 1.193 (.055) 1.3e-03 1.9e-03 4.0e-03 
1.177 
(.06) 6.4e-03 8.9e-03 1.9e-02 
1.157 
(.057) 1.0e-02 1.4e-02 3.1e-02 
1.167 
(.056) 5.6e-03 7.8e-03 1.7e-02 
Age     1.333 (.066) 1.5e-05 5.2e-05 9.0e-05 
1.371 
(.064) 8.4e-07 5.8e-06 5.8e-06 
1.329 
(.062) 3.7e-06 2.6e-05 2.6e-05 
Gender 
(female)     
.884 
(.062) 4.7e-02 .164 .282 
.889 
(.061) .055 .192 .33 
.882 
(.059) 3.3e-02 .116 .198 
Ethnicity 
(white)     
.867 
(.047) 2.3e-03 5.4e-03 1.4e-02 
.909 
(.042) 2.3e-02 .054 .115 
.9 




        .764 (.072) 1.9e-04 3.3e-04 7.8e-04 
.777 
(.071) 3.7e-04 7.2e-04 1.8e-03 
US residency         1.266 (.054) 1.3e-05 9.4e-05 9.4e-05 
1.245 




        .976 (.062) .693 .886 1 
.994 
(.059) .923 .923 1 
Income         .961 (.06) .498 .871 1 
.97 
(.057) .591 .977 1 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 
        1.142 (.047) 5.0e-03 3.5e-02 3.5e-02 
1.153 
(.046) 2.1e-03 1.5e-02 1.5e-02 
Months 





Supplementary Table 22. Use of political words and political extremity (distance from the scale midpoint for the 
partisanship measure). Predicting use of LIWC word categories taking users’ political extermity independent variable using 
logistic regression at tweet-level with standard error cluster on username. Model 1) no controls; Model 2) controlling for age, 
gender, and ethnicity; Model 3) controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, US residency, education, social/economic conservatism, 
income, and Log (time to complete the survey). p-values are reported based on two-tailed z-test. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Model 3 + month 
dummies 
 OR  (SE) p 
OR 
 (SE) p 
OR 
 (SE) p 
OR 
 (SE) p 











































    .877 (.095) .169 
.881 
(.093) .172 








    .976 (.063) .703 
.992 
(.06) .899 
Income     .966 (.061) .57 
.978 
(.058) .701 
Log (time to 
complete the 
survey) 






dummies No No No Yes 
 
 
